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We empirically investigate the costs and benefits of going from low inflation to price stability
in the case of Germany. Recent empirical evidence on the sacrifice ratio suggests that the break-
even point at which the pennanent benefits of reducing the trend rate of inflation by 2 percentage
points exceeds the temporary costs in terms of output losses is below 0.3% of GDP. We analyze the
welfare implications of the interactions even of moderate rates of inflation with the distorting effects
of the German tax system. Four areas of economic activity are considered: intertemporal allocation
of consumption, demand for owner-occupied housing, money demand, and government debt service.
We estimate the direct welfare effects of reducing the rate of inflation as well as the indirect tax
revenue effects. We find that reducing the inflation rate by 2 percentage points permanently
increases welfare by 1.4% of GDP. Finally, the optimal rate of disinflation is considered.
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An Analysis of Costs and Benefits
,Are the benefits of disinflation
worth the costs?"
Croushore (1992, p. 3)
1. Price stability: too much of a good thing?
The notion that price stability should be the priority target of monetary policy has
nowadays become widely accepted. This is due to the perception that high and
volatile inflation rates distort economic allocation and reduce the long-term growth
potential (Barro, 1995), whereas lasting monetary stability is conducive to
economic growth, social welfare and social cohesion alike. By contrast, the
consensus regarding the assessment of the "excess burden" associated with a
moderate inflation rate, and of the cost (the 'sacrifice ratio") of correcting such a
rate, is much more fragile.1 In other words, are the benefits of price stability and
the costs of disinflation still in reasonable proportion to one another, or should a
moderate pace of inflation - rather than undue zeal in fighting inflation - be
tolerated or even aimed at by economic policy makers?2
In the context of an in-depth analysis of the functions of money. Konieczny
(1994, p. 34) comes to the following conclusion regarding the optimality of an
inflation rate of zero: "The review of the theoretical arguments leads me to
conclude that the optimal rate of inflation is zero." He emphasizes especially the
adverse effects of inflation on the role of money as a unit of account (p. 32):
the uniqueness of zero arises from the accounting role of money: it is, simply,
in finitely easier to divide by one than by any other number. Only when the price
level is stable can money perform properly its role as a stable unit of account and
Inthis connection, it should not be entirely overlooked that the costs of a disinflation could at bottom be
charged to the preceding inflation, and would have to be offset against its gains.
2 S. Fischer (1994a, p. 40), for instance, argues: "The evidence points to an inflation range of! -3% as
being optimal.... Once lower inflation is attained, the challenge for policy is to preserve those gains."
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996, p.52) argue along similar lines: 'Comparing low inflation rates with a
zero inflation rate, we are convinced that the unemployment costs outweigh the costs of tax distortions.
We fully appreciate the benefits of stabilizing inflation at a low rate, and advocate that as an appropriate
target for monetary policy. But the optimal inflation target is not zero.'standard of value. The desirability of a stable standard of measurement is evident
from other arrangements: without exception, societies have chosen all other units
of measure to be of constant value. Uniquely among all numbers, the credibility of
zero can be defended on the grounds that t makes a pound (E') just like a pound
(Ib)'."
What is to be understood by "price stability" has been expressed in different ways.
A. Greenspan (1989), the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in the United
States, defines stable prices as ". ..price levels sufficiently stable so that
expectations of [price level] change do not become major factors in key economic
decisions." Decisions with a very short time horizon would probably turn out no
different with an inflation rate of 2 to 3 % from what they would be with price
stability. On the other hand, decisions involving a long-term commitment or a long
planning horizon must indeed take due account of the effects even of moderate
inflation rates, and an average inflation rate of zero will actually impinge on
decision-making if that rate is accompanied by high volatility. It also has to be
borne in mind that the threshold for the perception of inflationary processes
depends on past experience, and therefore may differ from country to country.
Anyway, inflation rates have been declining all over the world for a number of
years. As measured by the consumer price index, the inflation rate in the G-7
countries averaged 3.9% p.a. between 1960 and 1973. In the wake of oil price
hikes and an accommodating monetary policy on the part of some central banks,
it rose to 9.7% p.a. between 1973 and 1979. During the eighties the average
inflation rate still came to 5.5% p.a. But by 1995 the inflation rate of the G-7
countries was averaging 2.5 % and, of the 27 OECD nations, 18 registered an
inflation rate of less than 3% in 1995. Besides the globally higher sensitivity to
inflation as a result of the globalization of the financial markets (Issing, 1996a), in
the member states of the European Union this trend probably also owes
something to the envisaged monetary union.
Against this background, and in the light of the forthcoming debate on the
operative oblectives of monetary policy in the context of a monetary union in
Europe, the important economic policy question arises for many countries: do the
benefits of price stability warrant the costs of any further disinflation? In acomprehensive study for the United States, Feldstein put this question into
concrete shape as follows:3
"If the true and fully anticipated rate of inflation (Le. the measured rate of
inflation minus two percentage points) has stabilized at two percent, is the
gain from reducing inflation to zero worth the sacrifice in output and
employment that would be required to achieve it?"
Even though our experience of inflation in the Federal Republic of Germany is
different from that in the United States and the institutional framework here shows
specific features, nevertheless monetary policy in this country has to face the
same issue. The purpose of this paper is therefore to provide an empirically
supported answer for Germany to the question raised by Feldstein. Against the
background of the monetary policy strategy pursued by the Bundesbank, we first
consider, in the ensuing chapter 2, the costs of disinflation; in quantifying the
"sacrifice ratio" we draw on recently published empirical investigations. With
regard to the benefits of price stability, there have hitherto not been any such
detailed analyses for Germany as that by Feldstein for the United States. The
focal point of this paper is therefore chapter 3, in which, building on the
methodological foundation of Feldstein's approach, we examine the implications
for macroeconomic welfare of the interaction even of moderate rates of inflation
with the distorting effects of the tax system.4 First of all, we address, as part of an
intertemporal approach, the impact of inflation on the allocation of consumption
and saving. Then we investigate the implications of inflation for the demand for
owner-occupied housing. Thereafter, we consider the distorting effects of inflation
on money demand, which ever since Bailey's paper (1956) have been at the
centre of the literature on the welfare effects of inflation. Finally, we contemplate
the effects of inflation on public revenue from the money-creation process
(seigniorage) and on government debt service. Chapter 4 offers a summary and
some concluding remarks.
3Feldstein (1996, p. I). In the following we refer to this paperwithout anyfurther detai]s.
The fact that,for various reasons, theunderlying tax systems play a parlicu]ar part in the assessment of
inflation effects has been stressed in a number of papers; see for example Feldstein, Green and Sheshinsky
(1978), Tanzi (1980), King and Fullerton (1983), Sinn (1987) and Sievert etal. (1989)."Economists should be circumspect
when attempting to estimate the
costs of reducing the inflation rate."
Lucas (1990, p. 70)
2. On the costs of disinflation
The costs of a lasting reduction in the rate of inflation depend on nominal and real
rigidities on the overall goods and labour markets. Other significant factors are the
stance of fiscal policy, the monetary policy strategy pursued by the central bank,
and the degree of stability already reached. The Bundesbank's monetary policy
has been based on a monetary targeting strategy for over twenty years. With the
aid of this policy stance, it has proved possible (despite oil price hikes, monetary
upheavals and tensions in the wake of German unification) to limit the average
rate of inflation in those two decades to about 3 % p.a., and thus to distinctly
below the average level of the other industrial countries (5.5 % p.a.).
2.1 Monetary growth and inflation
Partly owing to deregulation of the financial markets and to financial innovations, a
number of countries have dispensed with the traditional monetary aggregates as
indicators and intermediate targets of monetary policy. Even so, there continues to
be a broad consensus that, over the long term, inflation is a monetary
phenomenon.5 Pursuant to the quantity equation, the product of the money stock
(M) and the velocity of circulation (V) equals the product of the price level (P) and
the real gross domestic product (Y). Written logarithmically, the following applies:6
(2.1) m+v=p÷y
In the shorter to medium tenn, trends in the general price level may certainly depart from the path marked
out by the growth of the money stock. Non-monetary price stimuli, temporary changes in the velocity of
circulation of money or cyclical fluctuations in real income may be superimposed upon the key
relationships for a considerable period. But this does not alter the basic fact that a process of sustained
erosion of the purchasing power of money is a monetary phenomenon, for which economic policy is
accountable.
6 In this chapter, small letters denote logarithms of variables and the symbol A stands for differences, i.e.
x =ln(X)and Ax x -x1.On the basis of this quantity equation, Hallman, Porter and Small (1989) define
the equilibrium price level (P-star or * for short) as the money stock per unit of
real production potential (*) at the equilibrium velocity of circulation (Vi:
(2.2) = m + vy *
If a stable long-term money demand function
(2.3) m—p=f30 + y+
exists,7 with 13o being either constant or a function of stationary variables and the
random variable c, with expectation zero, measuring deviations from long-term
money demand, then the equilibrium velocity of circulation can be expressed as8
(2.4)
The equilibrium price level can now be written:
(2.5) p*m —I y*
As table 2.1 shows, the growth rates of equilibrium prices
agree pretty well with the actual inflation rates.
over fairly long periods
Table 2.1: Monetary growth and inflation in Germany




















Including the increase in M3 and in potential production due to unification.
Source: Issing and TOdter (1995) and our own calculations.
For Germany it can be assumed that, even after unification, there is a stable long-term money demand
function; see Issing and TOdter (1995), Scharnagl (I 996a, b) and the referenccs listcd thcrc.
Issing and TOdter (1995) estimate the income elasticity of money demand ()inGcrmany at 1.43. Givcn a
growth rate of rca] production potential averaging 2.2 % pa., this implies a trend decline in the velocity of
tlflflflI 1 ccThe price gap, i.e. the difference between the equilibrium price level and the
actual price level, is composed of two components, viz, the degree of utilization of
production potential (output gap) and the degree of liquidity (velocity gap):
(2.6) pt—p= (y_y*)+(v*_v) = 13(y_y*)+E
In other words, pressure on prices is felt whenever production capacities are being
heavily utilised and/or whenever cash holding is higher than is consistent with
long-term money demand.
As empirical investigations for Germany show, the equilibrium price level and the
actual price level are cointegrated.9 It follows from this that differences between
the two variables are of a temporary nature and that disequilibria which have
arisen will disappear again over time. The course of price movements can then be
described (as is done here in stylised form) by an error correction equation:
(21) .Ap=Ape +A(p*_p) = Ape ÷x13(y_y*)÷xE
The smaller the parameter k, the more sluggishly prices respond to (goods- and
money-market) disequilibria, and the higher real rigidity is. The expected inflation
rate may be specified in this connection as a learning process in which inflation
expectations adjust to changes in equilibrium prices,
(2.8) APe = y Ap_1 + (1— y)Ap *
where the parametery is a measure of nominal rigidity.
2.2 The Bundesbank's monetary targeting strategy
The Bundesbank's monetary targeting strategy primarily serves the objective of
price stability. This strategy is geared to the long-term relationship between money
See TOdter andReimers (1994), Scharnagl (1996a).and prices, a relationship which is soundly based on the quantity theory and
proven empirically.10 Since 1988 the Bundesbank has used the money stock in
the definition M31' as the indicator and intermediate target of its monetary policy.
The annual target for the growth rate of the money stock (g) is derived in
accordance with a normative figure for the rate of inflation aimed at over the
medium term (it),andafter taking due account of forecasts of the growth of
production potential (Ay) and of the trend change in the velocity of circulation
(Av*):
(2.9)
If the Bundesbank succeeds in getting the money stock to grow in line with this
target (Am = R) then the equilibrium price level and - after the expiry of dynamic
adjustment reactions - the actual price level increase at the rate Ap* = Ap = it.
Ifthe Bundesbank wanted to reduce the target inflation rate from ittozero, it
would durably have to lower the growth rate of the money stock to ji = ftAy*. In the
event of uncertainty about the level of inflation, however, a distinction must be
made between an inflation target and a price-level target. To illustrate the
difference between the two targets, let it be assumed that the central bank
manages to attain the inflation target of zero, except for an identically and
independently distributed random variable vtwithexpectation zero and variance
o. The price level (Pt = Pt-i + V1) then follows a random walk process with
variance aT after T periods. Even though the expected inflation rate for the next
period is zero, the uncertainty about the price level in the more distant future may
be very high. If, by contrast, the central bank is pursuing the target of stability of
the price level, the variance of the price level is o, regardless of the time
horizon. The difference between the two strategies resides in the fact that, in the
case of an inflation target, the central bank does not need to respond to a
On the theoretical and empirical foundations of monetary policy, see Issing (1992); on pastexperience of
themonetary targeting strategy, see Issing (1995) and Konig (1996).
II Currency in circulation and the sight deposits, time deposits for less than four years and savings deposits
at three months' notice held by domestic non-banks -otherthan the Federal Government -atdomestic
credit institutions.temporary positive price shock, whereas, in the case of a price-level target, it is
forced to usher in a period of deflation.12
2.3 Evidence on the sacrifice ratio
The potential costs of disinflation consist in output and employment losses during
the period of running down inflation. The level of the costs depends on the slope
of the Phillips curve (the macroeconomic supply function, respectively). If the long-
term Phillips curve has a negative slope, any reduction in inflation results in lasting
losses of output and employment; if the curve is vertical, then the output and
employment losses are temporary.
In the above P*model, just as in neo-classical models, there need not be any
disinflation costs at all if the central bank announces the target of disinflation
credibly and it expectations respond immediately. Monetarist and neo-classical
models exhibit a vertical Phillips curve in the long run, and thus temporary
disinflation costs. The Keynesian modQls of the sixties postulated a lasting
negative trade-off. According to neo-Keynesian theory, too, changes in monetary
policy exert effects in real terms on account of rigidities in wage and price
movements.13 The idea of a permanent trade-off between inflation and
unemployment is, however, nowadays rejected by most economists: "There is a
general acceptance among economists that the medium, and longer, term Phillips
curve is vertical. Hence, there is no trade-off in the longer run between growth and
inflation. Consequently, there is now also a consensus that the primary macro-
policy objective of a central bank should be price stability."14
In the literature, it is customary to express the costs of disinflation in terms of what
is known as the "sacrifice ratio". The "output-sacrifice ratio" (a) measures the
12See also Scarth (1994), Fischer (l994a), von Hagen and Neumann (1996).
13 In simulations with small empirical models for the United States, Croushore (1992, p. 13) comes to the
conclusion: "Ina comparison of disinflation costs across the different models, the Monetarist-lype model
showsthelowest cost (actuallya negativecost),the New-Classical-type model shows zero cost, the
Keynesian-type model shows a high cost, andthePSTAR+ model shows a cost in betweenthehigh and
low costs ofthe other models."
14Goodhart (1992, p.332). Taylor (1992, p. 13) argues along similar lines: "But ifthereis any change in the
paradigmof macro-economics that most economists would agree with, it is that the trade-off view was
mistaken." Onthe other hand, Akerlof, Dickens and Peny (1996. p. 52) argue that lasting real costs of
disinflation exist on account of a'deeply rooted downward nominal wage rigidity' nthe economy: "The
unemployment costs are not one-time but, rather, permanent and substantial."cumulative output loss associated with the decline in the inflation rate. The
"unemployment-sacrifice ratio" (an) denotes the corresponding rise in the
unemployment rate. A link between the two concepts can be effected by the
"Okun gap". The simplest way of determining "sacrifice ratios" is to measure for
concrete historical periods of disinflation the cumulative output loss in relation to
its trend movement or to the cumulative change in the unemployment rate. By this
method, Schelde-Andersen (1992) computed sacrifice ratios for 16 OECD
countries. He selected the time-span from 1979 to 1982 as a common period of
disinflation in all countries. For Germany the ratio, relative to the unemployment
rate, works out at o = 6.4, whereas the indicator measured in terms of output
yields the value a = 2.2.15 Ball (1994) uses a similar method, but identifies specific
disinflation periods for each country. For Germany he obtains a ratio of a = 3.6 on
the basis of quarterly figures for the period 1980:1 to 1986:3.16 In a similar way to
Ball, but with a different approach to estimating production potential, Herrmann
(1996) computes a value of roughly a = 2.6 on the basis of quarterly data for the
period from 1981:4 to 1986:4, whereas the ratio for the most recent period of
disinflation from 1992:1 to 1995:4 works out at a = 2.2.
More analytically orientated approaches to the estimation of the costs of
disinflation are mostly based on Phillips-type relations for wage or price inflation.
In the context of the P-star model (2.7/8) the output-sacrifice ratio can be
measured as the relationship of the coefficients of nominal and real rigidity (see
Schelde-Andersen, 1992, p. 112):
(2.10)
In this model, a decline in monetary growth by one percentage point leads directly
to an equally large decrease in the growth rate of equilibrium prices and ultimately
also of the actual inflation rate. The expected inflation rate, however, initially
declines by only l-'y, in line with (2.8). Hence, a gap of y percent between the
actual decrease in the inflation rate and the expected decrease comes into being
15 Forthe longerperiodsfrom 1979 to 1985 or 1988. the values for o wereactuallylower, at 1.2 and 1.6
respectively. This suggests that the costs of disinflation are temporary, and decrease over time.
16Withannual data for the period 1980 to 1986 he arrived at the value 2.1.on account of nominal rigidities. In order to close this gap, the degree of capacity
utilization must drop by y/A13 percentage points. In the long run, i.e. after
expectations have come into line with the reduced monetary growth, output and
the unemployment rate revert to their equilibrium values.
On the basis of price equations similar to (2.7), Schelde-Andersen (1992)
estimates the value of a = 3.3 for the "output-sacrifice ratio" for Germany. A
Phillips relationship for the wage inflation rate yields a, =4.4 for the
"unemployment sacrifice ratio'. These estimates also take account of the
possibility of permanent disinflation costs, which might derive from the presence of
hysteresis effects on the labour market.1'
It is conspicuous that, in these studies, the costs of disinflation as estimated for
Germany lie distinctly above the OECD average (see table 2.2). In a comparison
by Schelde-Andersen (1992) on the basis of the sacrifice ratios for 16 OECD
countries estimated by him, Germany comes last, as the country with the highest
disinflation costs. One possible "explanation" might be that disinflation costs
appear to be all the higher, the lower the initial inflation .rate is: "A high initial rate
of inflation seems to reduce the sacrifice ratio, thus suggesting that inflation is
more costly to reduce when it is already very low."18
As the above remarks have illustrated, empirical estimates of sacrifice ratios
involve a high degree of uncertainty. The results depend crucially on the method,
the frequency of the data used, and a number of other factors. This is why
simulations with a macroeconomic structural model form an alternative to such
partial analytical estimates.19 Using the Bundesbank's multi-country econometric
model2° Jahnke (1996) simulated a permanent increase in shod-term interest
17 Schelde-Andersen (1992, p. 159) rejects the hypothesis of extreme hysteresis on the basis of estimates of
the Phillips relationship for all countries except the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the null
hypothesis that the unemployment rate follows a random walk process cannot be rejected for any of the 16
countries under review.
IS Schelde-Andersen (1992, p. 129). Other reasons for high disinflation costs relevant for Germany may
have been a high real exchange rate (i.e. an unfavourable international competitive position) and low
flexibility of the wage-bargaining process.
19 Schelde-Andersen (1992, p. 122) argues in favour of the model simulation approach: "Analytically, this is
byfar the most satisfactory method as itiscomprehensive andexogenous factors are isolated.7he
sensitivityof costs to changes inthe lag structure of the price and wage formation process can he
estimatedandit is alsopossible to illustrate theeffect of changesincredibility."
20 A documentation of the model is included in Deutsche Bundesbank (1994a, ]996c).rates which leads to a permanent decline in the inflation rate. The estimation
period for the forecasts of behavioural equations in the model extends from
1975:1 to 1995:4 and the simulation period comprises the time-span from 1997:1
to 2004:4. Over that span of eight years the sacrifice ratio, measured in terms of
output, works out at about a = 4; this value is above the estimates obtained by
partial analytical approaches.






































Schelde-Andersen (1992) 1960-1990 4.4 3.3
Model simulation
Jahnke (1996) 1997:1-2004:4 . 4.0
Altogether, the available empirical evidence suggests that, in the past, the output-
sacrif ice ratio for Germany can hardly have been above =At that level it
would have been about two to three times as high as the average of the other
OECD countries. The empirical estimates suggest that the costs of disinflation (C)
do not simply depend linearly on the disinflation rate but, rather, rise
disproportionally fast:
(2.11) C=aE',
21Feldstein calculates with an output-sacrifice ratio for the United States of 2 to 3.According to this equation, the reduction of the inflation rate by one percentage
point - regardless ofwould imply an output loss amounting to 4 96 of the gross
domestic product (GOP). Assuming (p = 1/2, the reduction of the inflation rate by
two percentage points, by contrast, would be associated with an output loss of
11.3 %.22
The available evidence suggests that the costs of disinflation are temporary, and
they are incurred over a comparatively short period.23 By contrast, the benefits of
price stability (G), expressed as a percentage of GOP, are permanent. To
compare costs and benefits, we consider the present value of the benefits in all
future periods. Given a discount rate of p, the present value of the benefits works
out at Gip. The reduction of inflation is beneficial if the permanent benefits of price
stability exceed the annualized costs of disinflation:24
(2.12)
Given a discount rate of p = 2.5 % p.a.25 and the above-mentioned values for the
other parameters (a=4, it=2, tp=l/2), the break-even point works out at G = 0.28.
Hence, to summarize the result of this chapter, the lasting benefits of price stability
would have to be greater than 0.28 % of GOP to warrant the costs of disinflation
by two percentage points. In the next chapter we shall turn to the calculation of the
benefits of price stability.
22 The reduction of inflation by three percentage points (from 4.5 to 1.5 % pa.) between 1992 and 1995 was
accompaniedby anoutput loss of 6 to 7 %. However, starting from this lower level, anyfurtherreducl]on
in inflation is likely to involve highercosts.
23Ball (1994) finds evidence suggesting that rapid disinflation is more favourable, whereas King (1996a)
argues in favour of a gradual disinflation process.
24 We are well aware in this context that this criterion derived from a present value concept treats the future
worse than the present. Hence there is a risk that too little importance is attached to future benefits and
hence to future generations. This is why the discount rate, in cases of doubt, should tend to be set low,
even though this remains ethically questionable from the point of view of inter-generational equity; see
Issing (l996b).
25 This rate is roughly in line with the difference between the real rate of interest under conditions of price




3. The benefits of price stability
The interaction between the tax system and inflation has repercussions on many
areas of economic activity. In this chapter, we are concerned with estimating the
welfare-theoretical benefits of price stability. In this context, we consider the
steady state effects on the following economic activities:
1. The intertemporal allocation of consumption and saving
2. The demand for owner-occupied housing
3. Money demand and seigniorage
4. Government debt service
We base our quantification of the benefits of price stability on a steady state with a
stable and fully anticipated inflation rate of 2 % p.a.26 and examine the
comparative static effects of lowering that rate to zero. We take into account both,
the direct benefits of reducing inflation-induced distortions and the indiret welfare
effects emanating from the change in tax revenue owing to the lowering of the
inflation rate, given the prevailing expenditure stance of the public authorities.
Other advantages of price stability are not included in our computation, although
we certainly do not deem them to be insignificant.27 The avoidance of distortions
due to inflation is accompanied by an enhancement of performance incentives
and a more efficient operation of economic processes. This includes the greater
informative value of relative prices, a better-balanced financing structure,
improved economic efficiency and higher productivity. Furthermore, redistribution
processes and redistribution conflicts due to inflation would be avoided, and the
wastage of scarce resources in order to side-step the adverse effects of inflation
would cease. In addition, under conditions of price stability the uncertainty
26What is meant is an effective inflation rate of 2 %,i.e.an inflation rate after adjustment for statistica]
measuring errors.
27 See the survey in Edey (1994), Fischer (1994b) and King (199614.engendered by inflation would diminish.28 The extent to which such improved
underlying conditions influence the long-term growth path is outside the scope of
our investigation. But, as is shown in models of the new growth theory, price
stability can also contribute to lastingly stronger economic growth (Black et al.
1994)P
In computing the welfare effects, we are largely following the approach adopted by
Feldstein, although we have made a number of modifications to take account of
the special features of the German tax system. Moreover, in calculating the
indirect revenue effects, we do not set the parameter which measures the
deadweight loss of the tax system exogenously but derive it from the model.
3.1 Intertemporal allocation of consumption and saving
The taxation of capital and of the earnings accruing from it involves welfare
losses. The existing tax system admittedly gives rise to such distortions even ii
price stability obtains. However, the interaction of inflation and distortionary
taxation results in an additional welfare loss, a "deadweight loss", which derives
from the fact that inflationary processes drive a "tax-inflation wedge" between the
gross yield and the net return on capital. This - as we shall show - reduces the real
return on investment, saving is impaired and the intertemporal allocation of
consumption is distorted. Similarly, the elimination of a positive inflation rate is
associated with deadweight gains.
3.1.1 The we/fare-theoretical approach
The starting point of the analysis is a two-period overlapping generations model.
In this model the following fundamental relationship exists between the savings of
the young generation (5) and their later consumption in old age (C):
28This uncertainty depends, as mentioned above, in part on whether the central bank is aiming al the target
of an inflation rate of zero or at price-level stability; see section 2.2.
29 Even a small increase in the pace of growth would generate a huge effect over Lime. If, in the event of a
decline in the inflation rate of 2 percentage points, the real growth rate rose by 0.2 percentage points (this
is the magnitude that Grimes (1996) ascertained empirically in a cross-section analysis for 27 countries),
given a difference of 2.5 percentage points between the real rate of interest and the real growth rate in the
starting period, the present value of the increase in real output amounts to three limes the current GDP.(3.1) S=pC
In this intertemporal budget equation, p denotes the price of future consumption.
Given a real net payment of interest on savings at a rate of r over a period of T
years (i.e. over one generation), the price of future consumption, expressed in
terms of units of present consumption, is:
(3.2) p=(l+r)_T withEpr =—T1
As the elasticity Epr indicates, an increase in the real net yield on savings leads to
a decline in the price of retirement consumption. The price-quantity combinations
in the three szenarios under investigation are designated as follows:
no tax, no inflation: (pa, C0)
tax, no inflation: (pi, C1)
tax and (2 %) inflation (P2. C2)
As is explained in more detail in Appendix A and illustrated by Figure Al, under
the welfare-theoretical approach to the quantification of the benefits of price
stability, the following quantities (areas) are relevant:
(3.3) A = -(Pi —p0)(C0 —C1)
(3.4) B = (P --p0)(C1 —C2)
(3.5) C = (P2 -p1)(C1 -C2)
(3.6) = (ru —p0)C2
(3.7) E = (p2 —p1)C2
In the absence of taxes and inflation, an economic agent may save the amount So
at the price P0 in order to achieve the consumption level C0 in old age. By theintroduction of a tax on investment income, the real yield declines and the price 01
consumption rises to Pi, while the consumption level tails to C1. As a result the
consumers' surplus decreases to the extent of the area A+8+D, and a tax yield
amounting to the area B+D comes into being. The difference between the two
areas, viz, the (Harberger) triangle A is, in terms of welfare economics, a
deadweight loss of taxation.
If, under the existing tax system, inflation is added (i.e. if the inflation rate rises
from zero to, say, it = 2 %), then the interaction of distortionary taxes and inflation
leads, as will be demonstrated below, to a decline in the real net yield and a
further rise in the price of future consumption to P2, whereas the level of
consumption falls to C2. Hence the consumers' surplus drops by the area CE,
whereas the tax yield changes by B-E. The difference is again a deadweight loss,
but its magnitude is no longer in line only with the "small triangle" of traditional
welfare theory, which arises through the 'disruption' of a 'first best' equilibrium.
The deadweight loss of inflation is, rather, the trapezoid B+C, which may be much
bigger, and which comes into being through the extension, due to inflatipn, of the
already existing tax-induced distortion. On the return to price stability, there arises
a correspondingly large deadweight gain.
As will be demonstrated below, the change in the tax yield at zero inflation as
measured by the area B-f is negative, i.e. a shortfall in tax revenue occurs owing
to the disappearance of inflation. Generally it is assumed that the changed tax
revenue is offset by a lump-sum tax, with a neutral effect in terms of welfare
accounting. This, however, is an unrealistic assumption. In actual fact, it is to be
expected that the shortfall in tax revenue is offset by the introduction, or raising, of
other taxes (at a given level of expenditure), which in their turn are associated wJth
welfare-theoretical deadweight losses.If these offsetting taxes involve a
deadweight loss per 0-Mark of tax revenue amounting to X, the welfare gain of
price stability will decrease to the extent of MB-f).3° The overall benefit of a
The parameter A can therefore be regarded as a measure of inefficiency of taxation; in the best case, i.e. in
one with offsetting neutraltaxes (lumpsum taxes), A would equal 0. tt is nevertheless far away from being
self-evident to make such compensatory changes in tax revenues, because one could object that the former
inflation process softened the budget constraint of the government.reduction in inflation then constitutes the sum of the direct deadweight gain and
the indirect income effect:
(3.8) Gc(B+C) + A(8E)
However, the form in which the tax losses due to the reduction in inflation would
be offset, and the associated welfare effects, remain an open question. Feldstein
assumes that X = 0.4 would be a reasonable "benchmark" value for the shadow
price of taxation. By contrast, we calculate the parameter X directly from our
model. More precisely, we approximate the deadweight loss of the German tax
system by the ratio
(3.9) Ac=A/(B+D)
whichis the deadweight loss of capital income taxation per D-Mark tax revenue in
the regime of price stability. The overall inefficiency of the regime with tax and
inflation is also of interest. It can be expressed by
(3.10) Ac+= (A+B+C)/(D+E)
whilethe marginal inefficiency of inflation-induced taxes is defined by
(3.11)
(see Figure Al in Appendix A).
The above-mentioned areas are, in each case, the product of a price component
and a quantity component, which will have to be measured in the next sections.
3.1.2 Interest rate and price effects
Given a real yield before tax of r0 and a tax rate on investment income of e, in the
event of an inflation rate of zero the real net yield amounts to(3.12) r1 =r0(1—8)
Given a positive inflation rate (7t = 2 %), investment income is composed of a
nominal and a real component. If the simple Fisher theorem applies, and if both
components of investment income are taxed at the same rate, then the real net
yield, in the case of inflation, approximates to:31
(3.13) r2 =(r0 +m)(1—8)—it= r1
—itO
That is to say, the real rate of interest is reduced owing to the inflation by the
amount mtB.32 In principle, this adverse effect of inflation on real net interest rates
could be prevented or lessened by indexing the tax system. But it is also
conceivable that market adjustment reactions might ensure that the nominal
interest rate (R) does not only increase to the extent of the inflation rate, as in the
simple Fisher theorem, but rather responds disproportionately last: dA/dit >
To take this into account, we write the real net interest rate in the case of inflation
as:
(3.14) r2 =(r+1 m)(1—B)—m=r1 —m
The parameter w, which will be very important hereafter, reflects the decline in the
real yield after tax that would result if the inflation rate were increased by one
percentage point; it can be interpreted as the effective marginal tax rate on the
inflation-induced component ol investment income. If @ = 0, the real and the
inflation-induced component of investment income are treated alike in tax terms,
31Furthermore, itisassumed that the gross real interest rate does not include any inflation-induced risk
premium and that a Tobin erfect(assetsubstitution between fixed capital and money on account of
inflation), if any, can be disregarded.
32 For instance, given a gross yield of 10 % and a tax rate of 50 %,thenet yield under conditions of price
stability would be 5 %.With2% inflation, the nominal gross yield would rise to 12% but the real net
yield would fall to 4 %.Itshould be borne in mind in this connection that the coupon is subject to tax,
with the result that, if the buying rate is above par, the net real interest rate on final matunty decreases
even further (et vice versa).
33 See Darby (1975) ajid Feldstein (1976). Given dRfdp=l/(l-&), the effect of inflation on the real net yield
would he eliminated entirely.and inflation exerts an unabated impact on the real net yield. II o = 0, inflation has
no effect on the real net yield. After the insertion of (3.12), (3.14) can also be
expressed as
(3.15) r2=r0(1—t)
where t is the effective average tax rate under conditions of inflation:
(3.16) t=8+-9-it
For Germany, the average real gross yield on fixed capital between 1991 and
1995 works out at r0 = 10.8 %, according to internal computations by the
Bundesbank?
The profits of German corporations distributed to domestic individuals are subject
to a variety of taxes: trade tax (on returns and capital), corporation tax, investment
income tax, property tax, income tax and the solidarity surcharge (to finance
German reunification). But, in contrast to the situation in the United States,
corporation tax and investment income tax (as well as the applicable solidarity
surcharge) are set off against income tax, in the form of a tax credit. As can be
seen from Appendix B, the average tax burden in this model calculation amounts
to t = 60.7 %•36 Thus, it follows from (3.15) that the real net yield is
= 10.8 (1 -0.607) = 4.24%.
This yield was achieved with an average inflation rate of 3.3% between 1991 and
1995. If it is assumed that the inflation rates recorded in the statistics overstate the
34The gross income of non-financial enterprises (excluding also the housing sector, agricultureandfishery
as well as imputed entrepreneur's earnings) in relation to net fixed capital at replacement costs is used as
an indicator of Lhe fixed capital yield. In order to prevent distortions on account of German unification, we
will henceforth use west German data (old Lander) for the period from 1991 to 1995 where necessary.
35 The following calculations refer to the stylised tax regulations prevaiting in 1995 and 1996. Starting in
1997 the investment income Lax was cancelled; furthermore the abolition of the trade tax on capital is
envisaged.
36 The average tax burden on the retained profits of a domestic corporation works out at 64.3 %,andthat on
the earnings of a partnership at a calculated rate of 55.3 %.actual increases in prices,37 then it is possible to calculate for the period in
question, as Feldstein did for the United States, an average effective inflation rate
of it = 2 %. The real net yield which would result in the absence of inflation can
now be computed from (3.14):
(3.14') r1 =r2 +mw
In order to determine the effective tax rate on nominal investment income (w), we
take account of the depreciation and the interest paid in the corporate sector and
the interest received in the private sector:38
(3.17)
In this equation,t is the marginal tax rate for distributed corporate profits and t' is
the (weighted) marginal income tax rate, including the solidarity surcharge.
Moreover, z denotes the present value of tax depreciation, b the debt ratio of
enterprises (the ratio of borrowed capital bearing interest at market rates to total
capital) and b' the ratio of shares and debt securities in households' portfolios.
Since the depreciation is effected in order to calculate the taxable earnings on the
basis of historic purchase prices (and not of replacement costs), inflation reduces
the present value of depreciation (z) and thus increases the effective tax rate.
Auerbach (1978) showed that capital costs increase by the amount tz if the
inflation rate rises by one percentage point. The present value depends on the
write-off period for tax purposes of the asset in question (T5), as well as on the
depreciation method used and the discounting factor (nominal market interest rate
after tax). As an approximation to the customary depreciation allowances, we use
the formula
The consumer price index is likely to be upwardly distorted on account of a product substitution bias, a
quality bias, a new goods bias and an outlet substitution bias; see Edey (1994).
38 In the private sector Feldstein also takes account of the effect of taxing capital gains, but this plays only a
subordinate role under German tax legislation (in income taxation there are so-called speculation periods
of six months and two years, respectively, for securities transactions and real property transactions).2/T
(3.18) z=
r2 +it +2/ T5
As the table in Appendix B shows, with the assumptions underlying our
considerations the marginal tax burden on the distributed profits of a domestic
corporation amounts to 'r = 48 %.39 If, moreover, one assumes an average write-
off period of T = 10 years, given a real net yield of r2 = 4.24 %, as calculated
above, and an inflation rate of 2 %, the present value of tax depreciation works out
at z = 0.76, that is to say, the reduction of the inflation rate by one percentage
point would increase the real yield by t z = 0.37 percentage points.
This positive effect on the real yield is counteracted by the tax deductibility of
nominal interest costs. If every percentage point of inflation increases the nominal
cost of corporate indebtedness by one percent,4° then the real interest costs
remain unchanged, whereas the enterprise obtains an additional deduction option
when calculating its taxable profits. In the case of an inflation rate of zero, this
relief of earnings would disappear. Given a corporate debt ratio of b = 45 %,41the
reduction of the inflation rate by one percentage point leads to a decline in thereal
yield oft b = 0.22 percentage points.
In the private sector, income taxes are likewise related to nominal interest income,
which gives rise to a taxation of fictitious profits. Hence a reduction in the inflation
rate lowers the effective tax rate and raises the real net yield. If the real gross yield
is independent of the level of the inflation rate, then the real net yield falls to the
extent of the marginal tax rate. On the basis of a ratio of shares and debt
securities to households' net financial assets of b' = 43 %,42 and on the
assumption of a weighted marginal income tax rate (including the solidarity
surcharge) of t'=37.6%, "inthe event of a decline in the inflation rate of one
The distributedprofits of a partnershipare subject to a marginal tax burden of identical size. On the other
hand, the marginal tax burden on the retained profits of a corporation, at 57 %,isactually even higher; see
Appendix B.'SeeFeldstein (p. 17), Mishkin (1992).
41 Thisfigure refersto the average corporations' liabilities other than their provisions, see Deutsche
Bundesbank(19941,, p. 16).
42 The net financialassets are calculated without mortgage debts. SeeDeutscheBundesbank(1996a) and
DeutscheBundesbank(I996b, pp.25 to 47).
This rate resultsfroma (weighted)income taxrate of 35 % and a solidaritysurcharge of7.5%; see
AppendixB.percentage point, a rise in real net interest rates of t'b' = 0.16 percentage points
occurs.
If one combines these three components, the outcome is an effective marginal tax
rate on inflation-induced capital income of 0 = 0.31. The upshot of this, in
accordance with equation (3.14'), for the real net yield with an inflation rate of zero
is: r1 = 4.24+2 * 0.31 = 4.81 %. According to this estimate, the real net yield would
rise by 0.63 percentage points on account of the disappearance of an inflation
rate of 2 %A4
If one assumes a time-span of T = 27 years for the average period elapsing
between the savings of the young generation and their consumption in old age,45
the following prices result from (3.2) for retirement consumption in the three
aforementioned scenarios:
Interest rate Price
no tax, no inflation: r0 = 10.80% p = 0.0627
with tax, no inflation: r1 = 4.87% Pi = 0.2771
with tax and (2 %) inflation:r2 = 4.24 % = 0.3255
3.1.3 A first approximation
Given the interest rates and price changes between the two regimes derived
above, we are now able to give a first and rough estimate of the benefits of price
stability. For this purpose we need an approximation of the change in retirement
consumption (C1 - C2). From equation (3.1) the following expression for the
consumption reaction can be derived:
(3.19) dCrccp resp. c1—c2
Forthe United States, Feldstein ascertaines a rise of 0.49 percentage points in the real net yietd.
5 For the United States, Feldstcin assumes a period 0130 years.where £cp denotes the compensated elasticity of retirement consumption with
respect to its price.46
Using the Slutsky decomposition and equations (3.1) and (3.2), the unobservable
compensated price elasticity of retirement consumption (ecp) and the
uncompensated interest rate elasticity of the savings of the young generation (s)
are related through
1+r
(3.20) =_(l_.oy_Tlsp)i with 1sp srf
where o is the income effect caused by a change in the interest rate; it is
measured by the ratio of the savings of the young generation to their (exogenous)
wage and salary income. In this section, we assume that savings are completely
interest-inelastic and we ignore the income effect, resulting in Ecp = - 1.
As equation (C.9) of Appendix C shows, in the overlapping generations model the
following link exists between the savings of the young generation (S2) and
aggregate private saving (S):
(3.21) S=S2(1—q) , q=(1+n+gT
In this equation, n+g = 2.2 % is the longer-term average growth rate of real wages
and salaries (and at the same time of the real domestic product) between 1986
and 1994.' If one also bears in mind that private saving accounts for a share 01
S = 9.3 % in GDP, savings of the young generation is estimated as: 52 = 20.9 %
of GDP, giving C2 = S2/2 = 64.1 % of GDP.8
Regarding the compensated demand function,seeSilberberg(1978) and Varian(1984).
47 In this case, the average rate of the last five years is distorted downwards owing to German unification,
which is why we use a 10-year average here.
48 Alternatively, the savings of the young generation can also be determined using equation (C5) of
Appendix C. In this way, the estimated value of the share of savings of the young generation in the gross
national product likewise works out at 82 = 20.9 %.Plugging this value into equation (3.19) and recalling from the previous section
that we estimated the relative change of the price for retirement consumption as
(pi-p2)/p2=-14.9%, we obtain the following increase in retirement consumption:
C1 - C2 = 9.55 % of GDP. In conjunction with equations (3.4) and (3.5) we obtain
2.05 + 0.23 = 2.28 % of GDP as a rule of thumb estimate of the trapezoid area
B+c.
To make the factors behind this calculation more explicit, we may alternatively use
the following simple but instructive formula
(3.22) B+C= s2PcPo P2P1 =0.209 *a774*a14924%of GOP
Pi P2
which largely confirms the result derived above. Equation (3.22) decomposes the
welfare gains of price stability into three factors. The first, savings of the young, is
the base for capital income taxation. The second factor is the change of the price
of retirement consumption due to capital income taxation, and the third factor
measures the price increase due to (2. %) inflation. This factor itselt can be
decomposed approximatively into the rate of (dis-) inflation (it), the implicit inflation
tax rate (@) defined in equation (3.14) and the average number of years until
retirement (T):
(3.22') P2 —Pi mwT
P2
Hence, the welfare costs of inflation tend to be high if the savings rate is high, if
capital income is taxed heavily, and/or if the tax system is not indexed. All of these
factors apply to the German economy and may explain - besides still deeply
rooted historical experiences with hyperinflation and more recent inflation periods
in the seventies and early eighties - the pronounced inflation aversion resp.
stability culture of the German population.Thus on the basis of this first approximation we may conclude that the elimination
of a low inflation rate of 2 % produces a direct welfare gain of more than 2 °k of
GOP. This ready reckoner admittedly neglects any substitution effects and income
effects of the change in interest rates. Moreover, the welfare effects of
compensatory tax revenue changes are not yet included. This is the subject of the
next section.
3.1.4 Quantity effects
For a more exact calculation of the quantity effects we need the uncompensated
interest elasticity of savings (flsr) as well as the savings ratio of the young
generation (ar). As outlined in more detail in Appendix C, from the overlapping
generations model we obtain tlsr = 0.25 for the uncompensated savings elasticity,
implying isp = -0.228. Since on average gross wages account for 56 % of GDP,
we get o = S2/GOP = 0.209/0.56 = 0.374. Therefore, equation (3.20) yields the
value c1, = - (1 - 0.374 - (-0.228)) = -0.854 for the price elasticity of retirement
consumption. This in turn yields C1-C2 = (-0.149) * 0.642 * (-0.854) = 8.16% of
GDP for the change in retirement consurtiption and, by the same procedure, cc-
cl = 49.9% of GOP. Finally, equation (3.1) provides the value C2 = 64.3 % of
GDP. Combining the estimated price and quantity effects, the areas A to E can






Owing to the disappearance of the distortions in the intertemporal allocation of
consumption and saving alone, the direct welfare gain of price stability amounts to
B÷C = 1.95 % of the gross domestic product.
49This assumes that the share of savings of the young generation is roughly the same under both regimes, i.e.
both with and without inflation.However, tax revenue would decrease by 8-E = -1.36 % of GDP. The deadweight
loss per D-Mark of tax revenue on the taxation of investment income is estimated
at Ac = A / (B+D) = 5.35/1 5.54 = 0.34. If one assumes that the above-computed
tax loss in the case of price stability is offset by raising taxes with a similar shadow
price, then the overall benefit of reducing inflation amounts on balance, pursuant
to equation (3.8), to
= 1.95 + 0.34 * (-1.36) = 1.48% of GDP
3.1.5 The problem of indexation
The shadow price of capital income taxes under conditions of inilation
(A+B+C)/(D+E) =0.43,ascalculated from (3.10), is distinctly higher than
under price stability, which is Ac = 0.34. The reason is the exceptionally high
shadow price of the implicit inflation tax, defined in (3.11), which turns out as
= (B+C)/(E-B) = 1.43, demonstrating yet again that inflation is an extremely
inefficient way of generating government revenue. Hence, the priniciple of
causation as well as welfare analysis suggest that monetary policy and not tax
policy should be primarily responsible to eliminate the highly inefficient inflation
tax.
Nevertheless, it is sometimes argued that the welfare gain deriving from the
reduction of inflation could be accomplished equally well by indexing the tax
system. This argument is correct only in principle. To attain the same real yield
under conditions of inflation as in a state of price stability, i.e. r1, the tax rate would
have to be made dependent on the inflation rate. The taxation of capital income
would have to be shaped in such a way that the effective average tax rate was a
diminishing function of the (true, not necessarily the measured) inflation rate, i.e.
the following equation would have to apply:
(3.16') e=t— it=O.607—2.87mGiven an inflation rate of 2 %, the average tax rate of t = 60.7 % would have to tall
by 5.7 percentage points to B = 55 % in order to attain the same effective taxation
as in the case of price stability. Since r0 is not necessarily constant, and since w
likewise hinges on variables rather than constants, the indexation formula would
constantly have to be adjusted. That is only one of many reasons why indexation
is not a practicable alternative to price stability.5° In the absence of inflation,
however, the lower effective tax rate would materialise "of its own accord".
3.1.6 The effect of social security contributions
The analysis so far implicitly assumed that a fully funded system is in place for
providing old age pensions. This assumption allowed us to keep the model
relatively simple. However, it would be interesting to check whether the results
obtained above survive if we take into account that actually many retirees receive
a significant amount of exogenous income through an unfunded (,,pay as you go")
system.
For this purpose we assume that the young pay a fraction of their grass wages as
contributions to the social security system (y W), receiving 'y W/q when retired,
where q = and n+g is the implicit rate of return in a ,,pay as you go"
system. (In a fully funded system the rate of return would be r.) Moreover, we
assume that the old generation leaves indirect bequests" (R) to the government
and the young generation receives transfers (Z) from the government which are
not directly linked to R. As explained in Appendix F, the budget constraint of the
extended overlapping generations model linking savings (S) of the young to their
retirement consumption (C) changes from equation (3.1) to
(3.1') S=pC—(yW—R)
q
From national accounts data for the period 1991 to 1995 we get the value
y = 0.15. The parameter R = 0.10 GDP was calibrated such that the model
A more detailed discussion of the problems posed by the indexation of the tax sysLem will be found in
Feldslein.pp. 45 to 50.approximately reproduces the income and expenditure account of the private
sector for the stated period.
Perhaps surprisingly, these extensions practically do not change the results. The
reduced distortion of intertemporal allocation of consumption yields benefits
amounting to
= 1.87 + 0.40 * (-0.91) = 1.50% of GOP
which is almost the same result as that obtained on the basis of the simpler
model.
3.2 Demand for owner-occupied housing
Owner-occupied dwellings are given preferential treatment in income taxation,
although they are fundamentally regarded as a consumer good.51 Nevertheless
some parts of the acquisition costs are allowed to be deducted from tax, while the
notional rental value (which represents implied investment income) is not subject
to taxation. (In contrast to the situation in the United States, however, debt interest
cannot be deducted from tax.) This results in a subsidy-induced distortion of the
demand for residential property as well as in a major shortfall in tax revenue.52
For reasons similar to those in the preceding chapter with regard to the
deadweight loss of inflation, the following trapezoid measures the inflation-induced
deadweight loss in the case of owner-occupied housing:
(3.23) GH1 =[(R0 — R1)+(R1 _R2)] (H2 — H1)
51The following comments are based on former tax legislation up to 1995, excluding the tax relief on loan
interest (which was limited Lo three years) up to the end of 1994 as well as the special assistance measures
in eastern Germany. The system of assistance for residential property that was reformed by the 'Owner-
occupied Housing Allowance Act" of January I, 1996 has not been taken into consideration.
52 A further benefit of price stability is the prevention of the "front loading" problem. This liquidity effect
makes the acquisition of residential property more difficult since -givenpositive inflation -thereal debt
service is highest at the start of the period and later decreases; see the Report of the Expert Commission
on Housing Policy (Bench: den Experrenkommission zur Wohnungspoliük) (1994, p. 162 ff.). Given price
stability, the real burden would, by contrast, be equally high throughout the period of the mortgage.
Croushore (1992) estimates the benefit of this effect alone -assuminga reduction of inflation by 2
percentage points -tobe between 0.06 % and 0.12 % of GDP.where H is the demand for owner-occupied housing and R represents the user
costs per D-Mark of invested capital.
3.2.1 The price and quantity component
In the absence of taxes and inflation, the implicit rental costs of residential
property would amount to
(3.24) R0=r0+m+6
where m+S is the sum of maintenance costs and depreciations per D-Mark of
employed capital, which we put at 4 %. Given a real gross rate of return in the
enterprise sector of r0 = 10.8%, the user costs amount to Fl0 = 14.6%. By
contrast, under the present tax legislation the following calculation is relevant for a
married couple given inflation:
(3.24') R2 = I1m +(1—js) (r2 +x)+(m+b)—t'h—it.
In this, g designates the share of the mortgage debt in the value of the house,
the nominal mortgage rate and h the tax concession per 0-Mark of invested
capital. Accordingly, the annual user costs of owner-occupied housing are the sum
of the (non-tax deductible) interest payments on the mortgage debts, the
opportunity costs of the invested capital as well as the maintenance and
depreciation costs. The tax saving due to the possibilities of deduction for tax
purposes and the inflation-induced increase in value of the property are to be
counted against this.
Under the previous form of section 10 of the Income Tax Code, 6 % of the
(maximum DM 330,000) acquisition costs of owner-occupied dwellings (which
were completed in 1992 or later) may be deducted for tax purpose for an initial
53 Owner-occupied houses are, in principle, also subject to general (net) wealth tax. Because of the low
values to be assessed arid the nominal value of the mortgage debts to be counted against them, however,
very little wealth tax or none at all is due. Profits from sales are basically negligible in terms of income tax
legislation.period of four years and 5 % for a further four years. Over eight years this
assistance adds up DM 145,200. In addition, the home buyers' child benefit of DM
11000 per child is deducted from liable tax. In the case of two children, this
produces an amount of DM 16,000, which - given a tax rate of t' = 37.6 °k -
corresponds to a gross deductible amount of around OM 42,600. In total, this
produces a reduction in the tax base of DM 187,800 for the entire period in which
assistance is granted. If the average acquisition costs are assumed to be
DM 373,000, this correponds to around 50 % of the acquisition costs. Both
marriage partners can make use of this assistance once. This is taken into
account by halving the useful economic life of the property to 25 years. Spread
over that period, the tax-deductible amount is Ii = 50/25 = 2 % p.a. of the
acquisition costs. Given a share of borrowing in capital spending on housing
construction of ji = 60 °k and a nominal annual mortgage rate of 8.5 % (at 2 %
inflation), (3.24) results in R2 = 0.6*8.5+(10.6)*(4.24+2) 0.376*2+42 = 8.85%.
Assuming that the simple Fisher relationship (dim/dit = 1) applies to the mortgage
rate, and also considering the fact that according to (3.14) dr2/dn = -o, it follows
from (3.24) that dR2/dit = -o(l-R). This assumes that h is independent of the
inflation rate. Given a lack of inflation, the user costs would hence rise to
(3.25) R1 =R2 +rcw(1—g)
Since w = 0.31 was calculated above, it follows that ft = 8.84 + 2 * 0.31 * (1-0.6) =
9.09 %, i.e. the elimination of an inflation rate of 2 % would increase the user
costs of owner-occupied housing by 0.24 percentage points. The welfare effect
(3.22) becomes GH1 = 0.0583 (HrH1). The increase in user costs which are
distorted downwards by inflation results in a decline in the demand for housing,
which leads to a corresponding reduction of capital misallocation. We approximate
this quantity effect by
Since199!, an income limit for a single/couple of DM 120,000/240,000 (relative to total sum of income)
has applied to basic assistance and home buyers' chi]d benefit.
55Between1991 and 1995, the pure construction costs amounted to an average of DM2,500/rn2. This gives
construction costs of around DM 305,000, assuming an average floor area of 122 m2. Furthermore, DM
50,000 in real estate costs are added to this, assuming that a property has an area of 200 rn2 and a real
estate price of DM 250/m2. Finally, assuming ancillary costs of around 5 % of the acquisition costs results
in the above-mentioned value of DM 373,000.R1 -R2
(3.26) H2 —H1 = H2 tHR
where CHA is the compensated interest rate elasticity of capital spending on
housing construction. Dopke (1996) estimates a long-term value of 0.14 for the
uncompensated interest rate elasticity. This corresponds to a compensated
elasticity of around EHR = 0.25. A ratio of 1.7 between the value of the owner-
occupied housing stock and GDP thus gives H2-H1 = 1.20% of GDP. In
conjunction with the price effect, the direct benefit of price stability with owner-
occupied housing is GH1 = 0.07 % of GDP.
3.2.2 The indirect revenue effect
The indirect revenue effect is defined as
(3.27) GH2 =Xc(Hi_H2)9
A fall in demand for owner-occupied housing of 1.20 % of GDP was produced by
(3.26). The capital stock in the enterprise sector increases by the same amount
and generates a gross rate of return of r0 = 10.8% and a net yield (without
inflation) of r1 = 4.87 %. This corresponds to an effective average rate of taxation
of 0 = 55%, i.e. GH2 = 1.20*0.108*0.55 = 0.07% of GOP. If the deadweight loss
per D-Mark of tax revenue calculated above is likewise put at Xc = 0.34 here, a net
benefit is produced on balance (given price stability) of
GM = GH1 + GH2 = 0.07 + 0.34 * 0.07 = 0.09% of GDP
56 The relationship e = + E*(l-IIY) applies between the compensated (c) and uncompensated (ri) elasticity,
where E is the income elasticity of the capital spending on housing construction and I-IIY the ratio of
capital spending on housing construction to disposable income. With the income elasticity of 1.26
estimated by Dopke (1996) and a ratio of capital spending on housing construction to disposable income
of 10%, this gives C = O.t4-it .26*0.10 0.25 for the compensated elasticity.3.3 Money demand and seigniorage
3.3.1 The direct welfare effect
Inflation increases the alternative costs of holding non-interest-bearing money
balances and lowers the real demand for money below its optimal level. Since the
real costs of an increase in the money stock are virtually nil, the optimal money
stock, according to Friedman (1969), is that in which the opportunity costs of cash
holdings are zero, i.e. r(gi+u*= 0.'
With the current system of taxation and given 2 % inflation, the opportunity costs
of cash holdings are r2+ir = 4.24 + 2.0 = 6.24 %. Given a zero inflation rate, these
costs fall to r1 = 4.87 %. A Harberger analysis of the money demand produces the
following trapezoid as the welfare gain due to a lowering of the inflation rate from
effectively 2 % to zero
(3.28) GM1 =[(ri —0)+-1(r2 +it_ri)](Mi —M2)
i.e. GM1 = 0.0556 (M1-M2). The change in the money demand can be
approximated by
r +it—r1
(3.29) M1 —M2 =r2 + it
According to our estimations, the interest rate elasticity of the demand for money
(currency in circulation and required reserves), is Mi = 0.25 in absolute value.
Given a 9 % share of these monetary components in GDP, it follows that M1-M2 =
0.50 % of GDP. The product of the price and the quantity effect gives the direct
The value r1 = 4.87 % has beendetermined for the realreturn givena zero inflation rate. Assuming for the
sake of simplicity that the real yield is a linear function of the inflation rate, to which dr/dit =-wapplies,
the optimal inflation rate according to Friedman is produced as the solution of r1O.311t* +21*0,i.e. m
=-7%. If there are no lump-sum taxes, it is theoretica]Iy possible, however, that the inflation rate is
positive as part of an optimal tax mix provided that money is regarded as an end good and not as all
intermediate good. See also the papers by Phelps (1973) and Chari etal.(1991).welfare gain of price stability in the money demand; it amounts to just GM1 =
0.03 % of GDP.
3.3.2 The indirect revenue effect
The indirect revenue effect of a reduced money demand is made up of three
components. Firstly, the reduction of the 'inflation tax' to real money balances (M)
leads to a loss of monetary seigniorage. This implies a welfare loss since other
distorting taxes have to be increased. The (active) seigniorage to the amount 0158
(3.30) S=itM
reactsto changes in the inflation rate in accordance with dS/dit = M + it (dM/dm).
Altersome transformations using d(r2+m) I dii = 1 - w, this may be written as
(3.31) dS= lEMi(lW) Mm
r2it
Assuming a ratio of the money balances (currency in circulation and minimum
reserves) to GDP of 9 % and an interest rate elasticity of the money demand in
absolute terms of Mj = 0.25, the loss of seigniorage if there is price stability comes
to dS = 0.17% of GDP.
Secondly, an income effect results from the fact that less capital and more real
money balances are held if there is price stability. The value M1-M2 = 0.50 % of
GDP has been determined above for the rise in the money demand. In the
enterprise sector this capital earns a gross return of r3 = 10.8% and is subject
(given price stability) to taxation at 8 = 55 %. The loss of income is thus
(3.32) dK = (M1-M2) r0 8
i.e. dK = 0.03 % of GDP.
58 Seigniorage also arises in a growing economy independentlyof the rateof inflation (passive seigniorage).Thirdly, the Government is in a position to reduce interest-bearing debt
instruments to the amount of the increased cash holdings. Although this is a one-




is the real rate of interest on the public debt. Assuming that the ratio of the debt
service to the public debt is y = 7.8 %, and given a rate of taxation of t' = 37.6 %,
there is a real interest rate of r = 2.87 %. The income effect thus comes to dB =
0.01 % of GDP. The total loss of government income if there is price stability is
therefore
(3.35) G=-dS-dK+dB
i.e. GM2 = -0.19% of GDP. Using the same shadow price of taxation as before
yields a small negative benefit of money demand under price stability:
CM = CMI + GM2 = 0.03 + 0.34(-0.19) = -0.04 % of GDP.
3.4 Government debt service
This section considers the welfare effect which results from the fact that higher
real rates of interest also increase the real costs of the Government's debt service.
A fully anticipated inflation leaves the real gross interest rate on the public debt
unchanged, whereas the inflation premium is subject to income tax. A lower
inflation rate hence does not reduce the pre-tax cost of the debt service, i.e. it
does not produce a direct advantage, but does reduce the tax revenue accruing
from the (eligible) interest rate payments on the public debt. This requires a
compensatory increase of other taxes.
The starting point for quantifying this effect is the following budget equation for the
change in the level of debt (0):(3.36) AD=G—T+(rg +mXI—t')D
wherer9 is the real gross interest rate on the public debt and t' is the marginal rate
of taxation. In equilibrium the public debt grows at the same rate as nominal GDP,
i.e. AD = D(n+g + it). Combining this equilibrium condition with the above budget
equation produces the following expression for the tax revenue:
(3.31) T=(1—t')(r -i-it)—(n+g+it)D+G [ g
Differentiation of this budget constraint with respect to the inflation rate gives the
reaction of tax revenue if there is a change in the inflation rate:
(3.38) dT = —-r'Ddm
Given a Government debt of D = 48% of GDP on an average of the years 1991-
95, dit = 2 p.p. produces a change of dT = 0.36 % of GDP. This fall in tax revenue
resulting from the elimination of inflation must be offset by compensatory tax
increases, which gives rise to a (negative) benetit:
GD = O.34(-0.36) = - 0.12 % of GDP
3.5 Overall benefit of price stability
The benefits of a zero inflation rate from the intertemporal allocation of
consumption (Gc), the demand for owner-occupied housing (GH), the demand for
money (GM) and the Government's debt service (GD) are combined in Table 3.1:Table 3.1: The benefits of price stability
Reduction of the effective inflation rate from 2 % to 0 %
(as % of GOP) ______________________ _______
Accordingly, the reduction of an (anticipated, equilibrium and effective) inflation
rate from 2 percent to zero results in a benefit of 1.41 % of GDP year by year.
This benefit is primarily the outcome of preventing inflation-induced distortions in
the intertemporal allocation of consumption and saving (1.48 % of GDP). The
correction of the distortions in the demand for owner-occupied housing makes a
net contribution amounting to 0.09 % of GDP. The slight benefit in the case of the
money demand is overcompensated by the associated shortfalls in government
income, resulting on balance in costs amounting to 0.04 % of GDP. The lack of
the alleviating financing effect of inflation in the servicing of the public debt leads
by itself to further costs, which are estimated at 0.12 % of GDP. Just under one-
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During the years 1991 to 1995 the statistically measured inflation rate in Germany
came to an average of 3.3 %. On account of the lack of precision in statistical
measuring, it is not possible to state beyond doubt whether this corresponds to an
effective inflation rate of 2 %. There is hence some amount of uncertainty
regarding the actual size of the "disinflation potential". As Chart 3.1 shows, the
benefit of price stability is a non-linear function of the size of reduction in inflation.
Assuming a reduction in inflation of 3 percentage points (which would then roughly
correspond to a measured inflation rate of zero), rather than of 2 percentage
points, the benefit increases from 1.41 % to 1.78 % of GDP. Conversely, a
reduction in the inflation rate by only 1 percentage point would still produce a
sizeable benefit of 0.85 % of GOP. By way of approximation, the relationship
between the size of the reduction in inflation (it) and the benefit as a percentage of
GOP (G) may be expressed by
(3.39) 0 =
where1/2 describes this relationship quite well.
Comparing the results for Germany with Feldstein's for the United States reveals
greater differences, above all, in terms of the intertemporal allocation 01
Figure 3.1: Benefit of price stability
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te of disintlation In %consumption. At 1.95 % of GDP (according to our calculation), the direct welfare
gain in this component is almost twice as great as Feldstein's at 1.02 %. In order
to explain this difference, the direct benefit of price stability in the consumption
allocation has been broken down into the product of four factors in the following
table 3.2: the relative price effect (APE), the interest rate elasticity of consumption,
the relative savings of the young generation and the share of private saving in
GDP. As this shows, the differences in the first three of those effects are
comparatively small and they mutually compensate each other. The greater
benefit of price stability in our calculation hence ultimately rests on the fact that
the saving ratio (as % of GDP) is almost twice as high in Germany as it is in the
United States.
Table 3.2: Comparison of results with the United States
country
RelativeInterest rate Savings of the Saving ratio = Direct
price effect elasticity young in % benefit as % of
generation GDP
APEii S)SN SNIGDP =
Germany (GY)
United States (US)
0.109 0854 2.251 9.30 = 1.95
0.092 1.230 1.800 5.00 = 1.02
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The higher saving ratio in Germany also largely explains the greater (negative)
indirect income effect in our calculation. Putting the saving ratio in our calculation
at 5 % for Germany, too, would produce a direct benefit in consumption allocation
of 1.26% of GDP (compared with 1.02% for the United States) and an indirect
income effect 01-0.22% (-0.10 %). Despite all the other differences in the system
of taxation and in the structural and behavioural parameters in the two economies,
the overall benefit of a reduction in the inflation rate by 2 percentage points - given
matching saving ratios - would be almost equally as high, at 0.94 % (1.02 %) of
GDP, as for the United States. Hence, it is the high savings rate in Germany,coupled with capital income taxes, which explains the large costs of even
moderate rates of inflation.
3.6 The risks: some sensitivity calculations
Our calculations of the scale of the benefit due to price stability rely on a number
of simplifying assumptions. Furthermore, some of the assumed quantitative values
for the structural and behavioural parameters of the German economy are
attended by considerable uncertainties. The table in Appendix D contains an
overview of all parametric assumptions (benchmark values) and a comparison
with the coefficients assumed by Feldstein for the United States.
In order to obtain some initial points of reference for the sensitivity of the
calculations in terms of the assumptions that have been made, we have
calculated each coefficient with alternative lower and upper values deviating from
the benchmark. The range of these values was chosen to correspond to what we
felt subjectively to be roughly two standard deviations.59 As the results of these
calculations show in Appendix E, varying the coefficients changes the overall
benefit only comparatively little, most results remain within the range of 1.41 %
+1- 0.10% of GDP. The benefit of price stability which has been estimated thus
appears to be quite robust in terms of the parametric assumptions that have been
made.
An exception to this is the length of the discounting period. If the period is reduced
(increased) from T=27 to T=24 (30) years, the benefit of price stability falls (rises)
to 1.30 (1.51) % of GDP. One very important parameter is also the average rate of
taxation on distributed profits (t=60.7 %), a 3 percentage point reduction, which
lowers the overall benefit to 1.31 % of GDP, whereas an increase by the same
amount raises the overall benefit of disinflation to 1.52 %. Besides this, the
marginal rate of taxation (f= 37.6 %) has an appreciable influence.
59FOranOI-TIIaII' distributed random variable, the stated interval includes the actual value with a probabilityIn addition, the calculations react quite sensitively to the assumption concerning
the interest rate elasticity of savings, for which a benchmark value of flsr =0.25
was determined (see Appendix C). A lowering of this elasticity to 0.10 reduces
the benefit to 1.11 % of GDP, whereas an increase to 0.40 (i.e. the benchmark
value used by Feldstein) increases the benefit to 1.74 %60
The shadow price of taxation for calculating the indirect revenue effects was set
by Feldstein at the benchmark value A =0.4and the alternative value 1. As
explained above, this parameter is not set exogenously in our calculations, but is
instead determined model-endogenously as the shadow price of capital income
taxation with the value A =0.34.
Deterministic parameter variations, in which all the other input values are kept
constant, can give only an incomplete description of the uncertainties contained in
a model calculation of this kind. For that reason, we have also used a Monte Carlo
simulation to assess the variability of the benefit of price stability. In doing this, we
regard all 23 parameters as independently normally distributed random
variables.61 The mean values of this distribution are the benchmark values used in
our calculation. The difference between the lower (or upper) parameter value
shown in Appendix E and the benchmark value was set as the (subjective)
standard deviation in all cases. As mentioned above, we assume that there is a
roughly 0.68 probability of the actual parameter value being within the stated
interval. We have taken a random sample from each of the 23 distributions and
recalculated the benefit of price stability. This operation was repeated 10,000
times.
Table 3.3 shows the results of these simulation exercises. At 1.39 % of GDP, the
arithmetical mean of the benefit of price stability is very close to the deterministic
value 1.41. The simulated standard deviation amounts to 0.47 °k of GDP. The
median of the distribution of the overall benefit is 1.34 % of GDP. This means (see
60This sensitivity to the interest rate elasticity oi savings is likewise revealed in the calcu]aLions made by
Feldstein, which show the overall benefit (0.65; 1.04; 162) for aLternative values of the interest rate
elasticity (0; 0.4; I).
61 The assumption of independence is undoubtedly a great simplification. An empirically grounded
estimation of the correlation snuctures between the structural parameters and the behavioural coefficients
ri nnhrnnrIliir crn,r frhitq.ri, hn,.-'-,-also Figure 3.2) that the distribution of the benefit is positively skewed, which is
likewise expressed in the positive Pearson measure of skewness of 0.30.
Table 3.3: The benefits of price stabilityt



























Overall benefit 1.39 0.473 1.34 0.30
÷) Based on 10,000 stochastic simulations.
*) Pearson's measure of skewness: 3 (arithmetical mean - median)! standard deviation.
According to the simulation calculations, the probability of an overall benefit of less
than 1 % of GDP is 0.21. By contrast, the probability of the benefit being greater
than the break-even point of G = 0.28 % of GDP (which was established in











3.7 On the optimal rate of disinflation
We have assumed hitherto that the rate of inflation is reduced by 2 percentage
points. In view of the determined costs and benefits, it remains questionable
whether this is the optimal strategy, however. This requires an additional test
criterion. Howitt (1990, p. 104), from a welfare-economic point of view, postulates
the following rule in order to assess which (dis)inflation rate a central bank should
aim for (I-towitt's Rule):62
"In order to estimate the optimal target rate of inflation, one must somehow
balance the gains from reducing inflation against the costs of doing so. The
reduction in inflation should continue as long as the present discounted value
of the benefits to society from a further small reduction exceeds the present
discounted value of the cost. The optimal target rate is the rate at which the
benefit of further reduction just equals the cost of raising unemployment by the
required amount above the natural rate."
62 1-lowitt'sRule is discussed in detail by Thornton (1996).
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Fte of disinflation in %As the preceding comments have shown, both the benefits (G) and the costs (C)
are regarded as (non-linear) functions of the rate of disinflation (it) (see (2.11),
(3.39) and Figure 3.3).
As a function of the constant discounting factor p (see section 2.3), the net benefit
(g) of disinflation may be expressed as
(3.40) 9(m) = G(m)—pC(m) =it —pwt'
In accordance with Howitt's Rule, the optimal disinflation rate (it*) must fulfil the
necessary condition ag I tht = 0, resulting in
(3.41) =
Lpo 1+y)
The higher the discounting rate and the higher the sacrifice ratio are, the lower the
optimal disinflation rate is. Assuming as before = 1/2, p = 2.5% and a = 4,
the optimal disinflation rate ism* = 3.3% (see Figure 3.4). The empiricaldata
used in the estimate reflect the average conditions in the period 1991-95 when the
statistically measured average inflation rate was 3.3 %. Bearing this in mind, the
result achieved suggests the conclusion that it would be optimal to aim at a zero
inflation rate or stability of the measured price level.63 The result obtained for the
optimal inflation rate in accordance with (3.41) depends to a considerable extent,
however, on the choice of the parameters included in it and, for that reason,
should not be overvalued. Additionally, there are uncertainties and risks both in
quantifying the disinflation costs and (as the sensitivity analyses have shown) in
quantifying the benefits which suggest a cautious interpretation of the results.
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Figure 3.3: Benefits and costs
of price stability"If there is anything in the world which ought to be
stable it is money, the measure of everything which
enters the channels of trade."
Francois Le Blanc, TraitO historique des monnayes de
France, Paris, 1690, quoted after Einaudi, 1953, p. 233.
4. Summary and conclusions
In the run-up to European monetary union and the discussion to be held on the
monetary policy strategy of a future European Central Bank, Issing (1996a,
p. 309) writes, "The current large measure of consensus is not a guarantee,
however, that the pendulum will not swing back at some point in the future ... The
risk of inflation is not dead simply because the statistics show price stability at
present It will have been really conquered only when it has disappeared once and
for all from the range of attractive available policy options."
In that respect, this study has confirmed for Germany what Feldstein discovered
for the United States: inflation is anything but an attractive option. The interaction
of even moderate rates of inflation with the existing system of taxation results in a
significant loss of welfare. The change from an equilibrium 'true' inflation rate of
2 % (which may correspond to a measured rate of 3 %) to a rate of zero brings
permanent welfare gains, equivalent to 1.4 % of GDP year for year. The
deadweight loss of two percent inflation is so great because Germany has a high
savings rate, capital income is taxed heavily, and the tax system is not indexed.
Inflation intensifies the distortions of taxation on capital income. For that reason
the welfare gains of price stability should not be measured by a ,,Harberger
triangle", but by a ,,Feldstein trapezoid". Even if we regard the output losses (in the
form of a temporary Okun gap) during disinflation as far away from being
negligible, there are, in our opinion, no convincing arguments for a moderate
inflation being superior to price stability.
In the years 1991 to 1995, the base period of our calculations, the average
measured rate of inflation turned out to be 3.3 % pa. In 1996 the rate of inflation
was 1.5 %. Considering the sustained economic problems of the new Lander ineast Germany and the difficult labor market situation, the question may be asked
whether this policy of disinflation by about 2 percentage points was justified or
whether the Bundesbank should have executed a more expansionary monetary
policy in order to stabilize the inflation rate at 3.3 %?
According to our calculations, the disinflation by almost 2 percentage points was
well justified, provided one is prepared to look not only at the short lived costs of
disinflation but also at the more long term gains of price stability. This is a powerful
argument for putting monetary policy into the hands of an independent and
forward-looking institution with a long time horizon. An independent central bank
with the primary goal of price stability is able to invest into the public good called
price stability even if the starting costs exceed the first round benefits, as it is
usually the case for long-lived investments. Besides this, it should'nt be forgotten
that the sacrifice ratio hinges on the degree of nominal rigidity, which can be
influenced to some extent by carefully choosing the timing, speed and policy-mix
of disinflation. The following menu of choice summarizes the main results of our
study.
Table 4.1: The menu of choice
Costs and benefits as % of GDP
Initial measured rate of inflation*)3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Rate of disinflation 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.3 4.05.0
Final measured rate of inflation 3.3 2.3 1.30.0-0.7-1.7
Permanent benefits 0.000.851.411.862.012.24
Annualized costs 0.000.100.280.600.801.12
Benefits minus costs 0.000.751.131.261.211.12
Annual loss in welfare: - 1.26-0.51-0.130.00-0.05-0.14
*) Average rate of inflation between 1991 and 1995Stabilizing the rate of inflation at 3.3 % would have avoided any costs of
disinflation, but there would have been no gains either. Compared to the optimal
strategy, the policy of preserving the status quo achieved at that time would have
incurred a permanent annual welfare loss of roughly 1.3 % of GDP. A modest
disinflation by 1 percentage point already would have reduced the unexploited
gains to 0.5 % of GOP. The actual amount of disinflation by almost 2 percentage
points exploits almost all potential gains, provided present rate of inflation will be
sustained. More disinflation (to bring the measured rate down to zero) would
produce only small additional gains. On the other hand, as table 4.1 shows,
overshooting the optimal rate of disinflation is associated with relatively small
welfare losses. However, one should keep in mind that there are other costs and
benefits of disinflation, not investigated in this paper. A too low, i.e. negative,
inflation rate may, for example, destabilize the international financial markets and
cause a range of other adjustment problems.
Having made these caveats, we conclude our study as follows:
Importance:Inflation, even at moderate rates of 2 or 3 % p.a., is a
very costly economic policy option.
Asymmetry: The welfare loss of a too high inflation rate is large, the
welfare loss of a too small inflation rate appears to be
small.
Robustness: It does not matter much whether monetary policy aims at
price stability in terms of the measured or the 'true' rate
of inflation. This decision should be based on criteria like
transparency, clarity and - above all - credibility.
At the outset we asked the question of whether the benefit of price stability
justifies the costs of disinflation. To this we can now give an unequivocal short
answer: No inflation is better than low intlation! In fact, our results clearly indicate
that the aim of price stability should receive priority. Tobin's often-quoted comment
(1977, p. 467) that "It takes a heap of Harberger Triangles to fill an Okun Gap..."
hence needs to be amended. In brief - and to extend the metaphor - it should go
on to read, "... but it needs only one single Feldstein Trapezoid to do it".References:
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Company.Appendix A: The welfare-theoretical approach
Consider the following three points (pj, C1) on the compensated demand function for
retirement consumption, each corresponding to a specific type of regime (see Figure
Al):











C2 C1 Co Consumption
Without taxes and inflation consumers' surplus (CS)*l is the sum of the areas AtoF.
Introducing capital income taxes in an environment of price stability moves the
equilibrium point from (po, C0) to (pi, C1) with less retirement consumption at a higher
price. Consumers surplus reduces to the area C+E+F and tax revenues (TR)
corresponding to the area B+D are created. The difference, the triangle A, is a
Problems with the concept of consumers' surplus as a measure of welfare effects are discussed in detail by
cilberhero(197Rdeadweight loss (OWL); it is the reduction of consumers' surplus which is not
compensated by higher tax revenues. The OWL per D-Mark of taxes raised is
(Al) Xc = Al (B+D).
Introducing both, taxes and inflation, moves the equilibrium point to (P2, C2) with a
reduced consumption level at a higher price. The remaining consumers' surplus is
the area F, whereas tax revenues correspond to the rectangle DiE. The deadweight
loss increases to the triangle A+B+C. The following table summarizes the welfare
acounting for the three regimes:
Regime Cs TR DWL
no tax, no inflation A+B+C+D+E+F - -.
tax, no inflation C+E+F S+D A
tax and inflation F D+E A+BiC
Hence, moving from the equilibrium with taxes and inflation to price stability
increases consumers' surplus by the area C+E and changes tax revenues by the
amount (8+D)-(D+E) = B—E. The welfare difference between the two regimes is a
reduction of deadweight loss, i.e. a deadweight gain, measured by the trapezoid
B+c.
Assuming that the government faces a strict budget constraint at the margin, the
change in tax revenues needs to be compensated by increasing (if negative) or
decreasing (if positive) other taxes. Denoting the deadweight loss per D-Mark of
some compensating tax by X, then
(A2) Gc = (B+C) + A (&E)
is the net deadweight gain of price stability.Appendix B: Taxation of corporate profit
Dlsinbuted Retained
Raft)profit of a dom. RatelIncome of a Rate)profits of a
(%)incorporated partnership dciii. incorp.
enterprise (%) (%)enterprise
a) Gross rate of return (%) 10.80 10.80 10.80
b)Trading capital (DM) 925.93 925.93 925.93
c) Gross profit (DM) 100.00101.00 100.00 101.00 100.00101.00
d) Tax on trading capital (of b) 0.80 -7.41 -7.41 -1.41-7.41 -7,41 -7.41
e) Trade earnings tax (of c+d) 16.67-15.43-15.60 -15.43 -15.60 -15.43 -15.60
I)Gross dividend! taxable income 77.18 77.99 77.16 71.99 77.16 17.99
g)Corporation tax (of I) 30.00-23.15-23.40 45.00-34.72 -35,10
i)Trade earnings tax (of l÷g) 25.00-13.50-13.65
j)Solidarity surcharge (of g+i) 1.50 -2.75 -2.78 -2.60 -2.63
k)Corp. property tax (of b) 0.45 -4.11 -4.17 -4.17 -4.17
I)Income tax (off) 36.00-27.01 -27.30 -27.01-27.30
m) Solidarity surcharge (of I) 7.50 -2.03 -2.05 2.032.05
n) Property tax (of b) 0.50-4.63 -4.63 0.38-3.47-3.47
o) Tax credit (g+i+) 39.40 39.83
p) Net profit (DM) 39.33 39.65 44.66 45.16 35.67 36.10
q) Net rate of return (%) 4.25
r)Tax burden (DM) 60.67 61.15 55.34 55.82 84.33 64.90
s) Marginal fax burden (95) . 48.02 .48.02 56.98
Effective calculated rates, relative to the respective basis for assessment.Appendix C: An overlapping generations model
Consider the following simple overlapping generations (OLG) model with a constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) - utility function:
C' Cl_tV




(C3) Cot+l =Syt p=(1+r)
C denotes consumption of the young generation and C0 is their retirement
consumption; S, represents savings of the young and W is their (exogenous) wage
income. Moreover, the parameter p represents the rate of time preference, 11W
measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution1 Equation (C3) corresponds to
equation (3.1) in the main text. The solution of this model is:
(C4) C; =WtQ with Q=[1+p11hfs1f
(C5) S =W(1—E1)
* 1
(C6) C01 =—W (1—12)
p
O is the propensity to consume of the young generation out of wage income.
Assuming that real wages grow with the rate n+g, from (C3) we can write
consumption of the presently old as the sum of their previous period's savings and
the accumulated interest income of these savings as
Sec Blanchard and Fischer (1989) aMRomer (1996). In the special case W —,1,the insLanlaneous utility
functioncininlif's Ic, the lou':qrithn,ic uutIitv f,inctinn(C/) C0=±S _1=9S q=(1+n+g)_T yt pyt
(Dis-) Saving of the presently old equals interest income minus consumption:
(C8) 5ot =.9(l—P)Syt—C0t =—q
Total savings (in period t) are equal to savings of the young plus savings of the
presently old:
(C9) SNt =Syt+Sot =t1—)Syt
In the period 1985 to 1994 the average annual growth rate of real wages was
n+g = 2.2%2 which, discounted over a generation of T=27 years, yields q = 0.556,
implying SN = 0.444 Si,. Private savings accounted for 9.3% of GOP on average
between 1991/95. Hence, from (C9) we get S = 0.209 CDP.
Alternatively, equation (CS) can be used to calculate savings of the young. This
requires estimating the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (11W). Applying the
Euler-equations approach, Flaig (1990, 1994) obtains an intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES) in the range of 0.24 to 0.43 from aggregate consumption data for
Germany. These low values imply a negative interest rate elasticity of savings.
However, estimates of the IES by the Euler-equations approach from aggregate data
are likely to be biased downward. Attanasio and Weber (1995, p. 569) show ,,that the
bias introduced by using aggregate consumption data to estimate the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution can be substantial". In particular, aggregate data may imply
an elasticity of substitution close to zero, even if it is one at the micro-level. This is
confirmed in an empirical study by Beaudry and Wincoop (1996) for the US based on
a panel of state data. They find ,,that the IFS for nondurables consumption is
significantly different from 0, and probably close to 1." Hence, Flaig's results would
'2 Dueto German unification and other factors, the growth rate of real wages in Wcst Germany in the period
1990 to 1994(1.4%) was exceptionally low and understates the long-term equilibrium growth rate. For this
reason we use the average erowth rate of the last ten years.seem to be consistent with 11W = 4/3. Using the real interest rate calculated in the
main text, i.e. r = r2 = 4.24% (p = 0.326) and assuming a rate of time preference of
p = 2.5% (s = 0.513), yields Q = 0.626. Wages in West Germany accounted for
a = 56% of GDP on average over the period 1990 to 1994. Hence, from (C5) we
obtain S, = 0.209 GDP, which matches the result obtained via (C9).
Differentiating equation (CS) with respect to the interest rate yields the interest rate
elasticity of the savings of the young:
(ClO)
This elasticity is positive if the elasticity of substitution (11W) is greater than 1. Using
the same parameter values as before, we obtain an estimate of the interest rate
elasticity of savings of the young of i = 0.23.Appendix D: Assumptions for calculating the benefits
Germany USA )
Effective inflation rate (%) 2.00 2.00
Fiscal policy parameters
Average tax rate on distributed profits (%) 60.70 41.00
Marginal tax rate on distributed profits (%) 48.00 35.00
Marg. income tax rate (md. solidarity surcharge) (%) 37.60 25.00
Property tax rate (%) - 2.50
Effective tax rate on capital gains (%) - 10.00
Auerbach-Elasticity - 0.57
Useful fiscal economic life of fixed assets (years) 10.00 -
Tax concession as % of the acquisition costs 2.00 -
of owner-occupied housing
Marginal excess burden of taxation -(0,4; 1,5)
Financial parameters
Real gross rate of ref urn (%) 10.80 9.20
Discounting period (years) 27.00 30.00
Ratio of corporate debt to capital (%) 45.00 40.00
Ratio of equity and bonds to net wealth 43.00 60.00
of private households (%)
Depreciation and maintennance costs of housing (%) 4.00 4.00
Nominal mortgage rate (%) 8.50 720
Ratio of mortgage to value of owner-occupied houses (%) 60.0020/50
Value of owner-occupied housing as 94 of GOP 170.00 105.00
Debt service as % of public debt 7.80 8.50
Public debt as 94 of GDP 48.00 50.00
Macroeconomic relations
Growth rate of real wages and resp. of GDP (%) 2.20 2.60
Ratio of wages to GDP (%) 56.00 75.00
Ratio of savings to GDP (%) 9.30 5.00
Ratio of money stock (currency in circulation 9.00 17.00
and minimum reserves) as % of GOP
Behavioural coefficients
interest rate elastidty of savings 0.25 (0; 0,4;1,0)
Comp. interest elasticity of investment in housing capital 0.25 0.80
Interest rate elasticity of money demand 0.25 0.20
*) Feldslein (1996)Appendix E: Sensitivity calculations
bench-Assumptions Results
mark A B A B
EffectIve inflation rate (%) 2.00 1.50 2.501.161.61
Fiscal policy parameters
Average tax rate on distributed profits (%) 60.7057.7063.701.311.52
Marginal tax rate on distributed profits (%) 48.0045.0051.001.381.45
Marg. income tax rate (md. solidarity surcharge) (%) 37.6032.6042.601.351.47
Property tax rate (%)
Effective tax rate on capital gains (%) -
Auerbach-Elasticity -
Useful fiscal economic life of fixed assets (years) 10.0013.00 7.001.321.51
Tax concession as % ol the acquisition costs 2.00 1 .00 3.001 .401 .42
of owner-occupied housing
Marginal excess burden ol taxation - - - - -
Financial parameters
Real gross rate of return (%) 10.80 9.8011.801 .401.42
Discounting period (years) 27.0024.0030.001.301.51
Ratio of corporate debt to capital (%) 45.0050.0040.001.321.50
Ratio of equity and bonds to net wealth 43.0038.0048.001.341.48
of private households (%)
Depreciation and maintenance costs ol housing (%) 4.00 5.00 3.001.401.42
Nominal mortgage rate (%) 8.50 9.50 7.501.401 .43
Ratio of mortgage to value of owner-occupied houSes (%) 60.0065.0055.001.401.43
Value of owner-occupied housing as % of GDP 170.00 150.00 190.001.401.42
Debt service as % of public debt 7.80 6.80 8.801.411.41
Public debt as °k of GDP 48.0051.0045.001.401.42
Macroeconomic relations
Growth rate of real wages and resp. of GDP (%) 2.20 2.70 1.701.321.51
Ratio of wages to GDP (%) 56.0053.0059.001.361.46
Ratio of savings to GOP (%) 9.30 8.3010.301.341.47
Ratio of money stock (currency in circulation 9.0010.00 8.001.411.42
and minimum reserves) as % of GDP
Behavioural coefficients
Interest rate elasticity of savings 0.25 0.10 0.401.111.74
Comp. interest rate elasticity 0.25 0.15 0.35 1 .37 1 .45
of investment in houstng capital
Interest rate elasticity of money demand 0.25 0.10 0.401.401.43Appendix F: An OL.G model with transfers
The analysis so tar implicitly assumed that a tully funded system is in place for
providing old age pensions. The purpose of this appendix is to take into account that
actually many retirees receive a significant amount of exogenous income through an
untunded (,,pay as you go") system.
We retain the utility function (Cl) of Appendix C, i.e.,
c,j" C T (Fl) Max +s ;s=(l+p), p>—l , W>O





We assume that the total wage income accrues to the young generation, as well as
all government transters, except pension payments. On the other hand, the old
(retired) generation receives all non-wage income plus the pension payments.
Hence, in equation (F2), W represents the (exogenous) gross wage income,
including employers' contributions to social security (i.e. to the pension fund and to
the health and unemployment insurance); t is an average 'tax' rate which comprises
employee's and employer's contributions to the social security system except tor
contributions to the pension tund;is the rate paid (by both, employers and
employees) to the pension fund; Z is the amount of net government transfers
received by the young generation. In equation (F3), WJq is the amount of pensions
received by the old generation; R is the net amount of transfers left by the old
generation. We assume that this amount is channelled through the government
sector such that there is no direct link between the amount bequeathed by the old
(R) and the amount of transfers received by the young (Z). Note, that in contrast tothe rate of return (r) of savings of the young, the implicit rate of return of the
contributions to the ,,pay as you go" - pension fund is the real growth rate ni-g.
Solving (Fl) subject to the restrictions (F2) and (F3) yields the following optimal
consumption and saving schedules:
(F4) C =[Wt(1_t_y)+Zt]u+[7Wt —RtIQ
(F5) S =[wt(1-.-t—y)+Zt](1—Q)—P[yWt —Rt]Q
(F6) C01 =±[Wt(l_t_'y)+Zt](1_Q)_[yWt —Rtl(1—Q)
The parameter Q is defined in eq. (C4) of Appendix C. Assuming, that the growth
rate of real wages (W) and transfers (Z, R) is n÷g, consumption of the presently old
(eq. C7) becomes:
(F7) C01 =9S1 +yW —R1
The equations for savings of the presently old (CS) and total private savings (C9)
remain valid, however:
(EB) Sot = —q5yt
(F9) SNt =(l—q)Syt
These relationships imply the following accounting table for period t:
Table Fl: Income and expenditure of the private sector









Total W Q Y,
In a fully funded system we have p = q and yW! p drops out of eq. (P3) when (F2) is inserted. Hence, the
optimal savings and consumption plan is independent of contributions to the pension fund (y) in a fully funded
svstenlThe higher real interest rate increases savings of the young only by 0.5% of GOP
and reduces consumption of the young accordingly (note that the net income of the
young is given exogenously).'1 Because dis-saving of the old rises by 0.3% of GDP,
total private savings increase only by O.2% of GOP. The biggest change occurs for
consumption of the old: this aggregate increases from 29.3% to 35.8% of GDP.
What are the welfare consequences of this move from 2 percent inflation to price
stability? To re-calculate the benefits of price stability along the lines of section 3, we
have to recognize that equation (3.1) (S=pC) changes to (F3), which is reproduced
here for concenience, dropping subscripts, as:
(F3'/3.1') S=pC—(yW--R)
From this equation we derive the following expression for the price elasticity of
savings:
(FlO) flsp [Wn_t_±z10+ 7(lnQp)]Q
where ri=(—1-—1)(1--Q)
The compensated price elasticity of retirement consumption becomes:
(3.20') Ecp.
with =d(pC)=
'This suggests that the change of the marginal product of capital would be small justifying our assumption of aIntroducing the parameter values used above produces ii = 0.125, flsp = - 0.170,
(ris, = 0.186), a = 0.246, and e = -0.987. This, in turn, yields C1-C2 = 7,82%of
GDP as the induced change of old-age consumption.
Using (3.3) to (3.7) we obtain the following areas under the compensateddemand
function:




E= 2.58% of GDP
The net benefit of price stabilityinthis extended model incorporating
intergenerational transfers turns out as
Gc = 1.87 + O.40* (-0.91) = 1.50% of GDP
Hence, the gain from improved intertemporal allocation of consumption and saving is
almost the same as that obtained on the basis of the simpler model in the body of
the paper.